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h i g h l i g h t s
• We consider a bilateral trade model with a finite number of valuations.
• In this setting the classic impossibility result may be avoided.
• We illustrate the difference between interim- and ex post-implementation.
• For threshold trading rules, ex post-implementation equals posted price implementation.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 27 October 2015
Received in revised form
2 August 2016
Accepted 15 August 2016
Available online 16 September 2016
a b s t r a c t
We study bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object when each set of
valuations is finite. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for interim-implementable trading
rules, analogous to the result in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and a necessary condition for
mechanisms that are free from ex post regret on and off equilibrium path. Based on these two theorems,
our contribution is three-fold. First, we illustrate the results by means of three examples. Second, in
contrast to the continuous model, there always exist strictly positive probability mass functions such
that ex post efficiency and interim-implementability is feasible. Third, we show the difference between
interim- and expost-implementation. In the class of threshold trading rules, interim-implementation only
precludes inefficient trade, while ex post-implementation is equivalent to posted price implementation.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The bargaining problem with one buyer, one seller, a single ob-
ject and two-sided incomplete information has attracted a lot of at-
tention since the impossibility result ofMyerson and Satterthwaite
(1983). Theirmain theorem says that there exists nomechanism in
which both players have an incentive to report truthfully, are will-
ing to participate and that is ex post efficient, unless some outside
party is willing to subsidize. The result is in contrast to some of the
positive results in economics that were known in the literature at
that time. In particular to the famous Coase’ theorem, Coase (1960),
that states that if transaction costs are sufficiently low, bargaining
will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation.
Other positive results include the First Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics, which states that market equilibria are Pareto
∗ Corresponding author.




0165-4896/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.efficient under the assumption of complete markets and price tak-
ing behaviour, and the VCG mechanism, that finds an efficient
allocation in the setting with multiple buyers and one-sided in-
complete information.
One of the assumptions in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983),
and in many related papers, is that valuations are continuously
distributed over overlapping intervals with positive density.
However, there does not seem to be a compellingmodelling reason
to prefer continuous type spaces to discrete ones (Vohra, 2011). In
many applications, for example in monetary transactions, agents
typically reason with a limited amount of possible valuations. The
assumption of a positive density is crucial for the impossibility
result, as Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) already provide
an example with a simple discrete setting, two types for each
player, for which the non-existence result does not hold. Matsuo
(1989) elaborates on this example by characterizing the condition
under which ex post efficient trade is feasible if both players
have two types. We focus on bilateral trading with finite sets
of valuations, similar to recent work like Kos and Manea (2009)
and Othman and Sandholm (2009), and show the importance
of the assumption of continuous valuations for the impossibility
J. Flesch et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 84 (2016) 68–75 69result. We find that for every set of discrete valuations, there exist
probabilitymass functions such that expost efficiency and interim-
implementability is feasible.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) consider the condition
interim individual rationality, meaning that each player’s expected
utility conditional on his type is non-negative. This allows the use
of mechanisms in which, for example, a type of buyer is required
to make a payment while trade does not take place. In most
markets this does not occur, since ex post enforcement of payment
is usually not feasible when the terms of trade lead to loss of
utility. We focus on mechanisms that are free from ex post regret
on and off equilibrium path. We use an idea from Matthews and
Postlewaite (1989), in which players have the option to opt out of
the mechanism after the mechanism is played and the outcome
is revealed. This additional option gives players the possibility
to guarantee the outside utility of zero. In order to illustrate the
difference between the two conditions, we consider the class of
threshold trading rules. All trading rules within this class that
preclude inefficient trade are interim-implementable, while ex
post individually rational trading rules can only be implemented by
means of a posted pricemechanism. Thus, ex post-implementation
selects the posted price mechanisms from among all threshold
trading rules that avoid inefficient trade.
Related literature.We briefly outline the papers closely related
to ours. In a setting with one seller, multiple buyers, a single
object and one-sided incomplete information, Myerson (1981)
characterizes the auction that maximizes the expected revenue for
the seller.
Next, we consider the settingwith one seller, one buyer, a single
object and two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) show that there is nomechanism that is budget-
balanced, incentive compatible, interim individually rational and
ex post efficient. They also derive a characterization of the incen-
tive compatible mechanism that maximizes the expected gains
from trade. Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) show that if a mecha-
nism is dominant strategy incentive compatible and ex post in-
dividually rational, then it is a posted price mechanism. Matsuo
(1989) assumes that both players have two types and presents a
necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficientmechanisms
to be feasible. Gresik (1991b) identifies the mechanism that max-
imizes the expected gains from trade for regular probability dis-
tributions. He also shows that, when the probability distributions
are regular and unimodular, this mechanism is incentive com-
patible and ex post individually rational. For uniform probability
distributions, the identified mechanism coincides with the linear
equilibrium in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). Gresik (1991a)
assumes that both players have two types and statistically de-
pendent beliefs. He derives a necessary and sufficient condition
for ex post efficient trade to be feasible. Kos and Manea (2009)
introduce a modification of the VCG mechanism, and show that
there exists an incentive compatible, interim individually rational
and efficient mechanism if and only if the modified VCG mech-
anism does not run a deficit. Othman and Sandholm (2009) run
simulations with discrete valuations to check how often efficient
trade can be obtained. Garratt and Pycia (2016) show that efficient
trade is generically possible if the assumption of quasi-linear util-
ities is relaxed and the utilities are not too responsive to private
information.
Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) introduce the model with
quitting rights for players, also called veto rights in the literature.
The idea is that players have the right to reject the trade after
the outcome of the mechanism. Forges (1999) extends this idea
to multiple buyers. Compte and Jehiel (2009) show that in their
bargaining model with ex post quitting rights and correlations,
inefficiencies are inevitable. Galavotti et al. (2011) discuss thepossibility of efficient partnership dissolutionwith ex post quitting
rights.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model. The two theorems on interim-implementation and
ex post-implementation with illustrating examples are given in
Section 3. Section 4 studies the class of ex post efficient trading
rules and the class of threshold trading rules. Section 5 concludes.
Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model
Consider the following discrete bilateral trade model in which
two players, a buyer and a seller, bargain under incomplete
information. The seller currently owns an indivisible object that
the buyer is willing to buy. Let the buyer have valuations drawn
from a discrete set Vb = {b1, . . . , bm}, where 0 ≤ b1 < · · · < bm,
and the seller have valuations drawn from a discrete set Vs =
{s1, . . . , sn}, where 0 ≤ s1 < · · · < sn. We assume the standard
independent private values information structure. The valuations
of the two agents are independently distributed random variables,
with probability mass functions fb : Vb → [0, 1] such thatm
i=1 fb(bi) = 1 and fs : Vs → [0, 1] such that
m
j=1 fs(sj) = 1.
Let Fb : R → [0, 1] be the cumulative distribution corresponding
to fb, Fb(v) =

bi≤v
fb(bi), and Fs : R → [0, 1] the cumulative




The bargaining process is modelled by a direct mechanism.
A direct bargaining mechanism is a mechanism in which each
player simultaneously reports a valuation to a coordinator. The
coordinator will then determine whether the object is traded
and what the transfer will be. Without loss of generality we can
concentrate on direct mechanisms due to the revelation principle.
The revelation principle says that for any Bayesian equilibrium in
any bargaining game, there exists an equivalent direct mechanism
yielding the same outcome (both an equivalent allocation and
payment) in which truthful reporting is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Accordingly, we can mimic any equilibrium in any bargaining
mechanism by a direct mechanism.
Formally, a direct mechanism is a pair of functions (q, t),
q : Vb × Vs → [0, 1],
t : Vb × Vs → R,
where q(bi, sj) is the probability that the object is traded and
t(bi, sj) is the transfer of the buyer to the seller, when bi ∈ Vb and
sj ∈ Vs are the reported valuations. We refer to q as the trading
rule, and t as the transfer scheme.
















t(bi, sj) · fb(bi).
Thus q̄b(bi) and t̄b(bi) are the expected probability of trade and the
expected transfer, respectively, for a buyer reporting bi ∈ Vb, given
that the seller reports truthfully. Analogous for the seller.
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quitting rights
In most of the literature, the expected utility of a player is
defined as follows. For a given direct mechanism (q, t), define
the expected utility of a buyer reporting bk ∈ Vb when having
valuation bi ∈ Vb and the expected utility of a seller reporting
sℓ ∈ Vs when having valuation sj ∈ Vs, given that the other player
reports truthfully, by
Ub(bk, bi) = bi · q̄b(bk) − t̄b(bk),
Us(sℓ, sj) = t̄s(sℓ) − sj · q̄s(sℓ).
The focus of this paper is on mechanisms that are free from ex
post regret. We assume that after the mechanism has been played
and the outcome of the mechanism is revealed, each player has
the option to refuse the outcome of the mechanism and receive
an outside utility of zero. This idea is introduced in Matthews
and Postlewaite (1989). For a given direct mechanism (q, t) with
quitting rights, define the expected utility of a buyer reporting
bk ∈ Vb when having valuation bi ∈ Vb and the expected utility
of a seller reporting sℓ ∈ Vs when having valuation sj ∈ Vs, given
that the other player reports truthfully, by
U∗b (bk, bi) =
n
j=1








max{0, t(bi, sℓ) − sj · q(bi, sℓ)} · fb(bi).
Themaxoperator inU∗ represents thepossibility to reject the trade
ex post.
Definition 3.1. A direct mechanism (q, t) is incentive compatible
(IC) if for all bi, bk ∈ Vb and all sj, sℓ ∈ Vs
Ub(bi, bi) ≥ Ub(bk, bi) and Us(sj, sj) ≥ Us(sℓ, sj).
A direct mechanism (q, t) is incentive compatible with quitting
rights (IC*) if for all bi, bk ∈ Vb and all sj, sℓ ∈ Vs
U∗b (bi, bi) ≥ U
∗











The above two conditions guarantee that truthful reporting is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the two respective settings.
Much work in the literature is concerned with interim
individual rationality, while in the present study, we are interested
in mechanisms that satisfy ex post individual rationality.
Definition 3.2. A direct mechanism (q, t) is interim individually
rational (IIR) if for all bi ∈ Vb and all sj ∈ Vs
Ub(bi, bi) ≥ 0 and Us(sj, sj) ≥ 0.
A direct mechanism (q, t) is ex post individually rational (EPIR) if
for all bi ∈ Vb and all sj ∈ Vs
bi · q(bi, sj) − t(bi, sj) ≥ 0 and t(bi, sj) − sj · q(bi, sj) ≥ 0.
A mechanism is interim individually rational if on the equilib-
rium path, given his type, but before he learns the other player’s
type, each player prefers to participate in the mechanism over the
outside option. A mechanism is ex post individually rational if on
the equilibrium path, for any realization of types, no player regrets
his participation in the mechanism even after observing the real-
ized values.
A trading rule q is interim-implementable if there exists a
transfer scheme t such that (q, t) is IC and IIR. A trading rule q isex post-implementable if there exists a transfer scheme t such that
(q, t) is IC and EPIR. A trading rule q is ex post-implementable with
quitting rights if there exists a transfer scheme t such that (q, t) is
IC* and EPIR.
























sj+1 · Fs(sj) − sj · Fs(sj−1)

· q̄s(sj)
− sn · Fs(sn−1) · q̄s(sn) +
m
i=1
bi · q(bi, sn).
Observe that ub and ls include the buyer’s and seller’s virtual
valuation, respectively. For an economic interpretation of these
quantities, we refer to Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Kos and
Manea (2009).
The first result is the characterization of an interim-implement-
able trading rule, analogous to the result in Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983).
Theorem 3.3. A trading rule q is interim-implementable if and only
if q̄b(bi) is non-decreasing in bi, q̄s(sj) is non-increasing in sj, and
ls ≤ ub.
The second result provides a necessary condition for a trading
rule that is ex post-implementable with quitting rights.











Consequently, if a trading rule q is ex post-implementable with
quitting rights, then lb ≤ us.



































− t̄s (sn) ≤
n−1
ℓ=j
sℓ+1 · (q̄s (sℓ) − q̄s (sℓ+1)) .
By EPIR, we have t̄s(sn) ≤
m








sℓ+1 · (q̄s (sℓ) − q̄s (sℓ+1)) +
m
i=1
bi · q(bi, sn). (1)

































sj+1 · Fs(sj) − sj · Fs(sj−1)

· q̄s(sj)
− sn · Fs(sn−1) · q̄s(sn) +
m
i=1
bi · q(bi, sn)
= us.
This completes the proof. 
Remark. The result of Theorem 3.4 also applies if (q, t) is IC and
EPIR.
In the upcoming three examples, we illustrate the following three
facts.
(1) The conditions of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 do not characterize ex
post-implementation with quitting rights.
(2) Ex post-implementation with quitting rights is not equivalent
to ex post-implementation.
(3) The choice of valuations in the set of valuations matters
for implementation. We give an example in which if we
consider a valuationwith a probability of zero, implementation
is not feasible, while if we not consider that valuation,
implementation is feasible.
Example 3.5. We provide an example of a trading rule for which
q̄b(bi) is non-decreasing in bi, q̄s(sj) is non-increasing in sj, ls ≤
ub, and lb ≤ us, but which is not ex post-implementable with
quitting rights. So, Theorem 3.4 does not characterize ex post-
implementation with quitting rights.
Let Vb = Vs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and assume that
the valuations are uniformly distributed. Consider Trading rule 2
below.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Trading rule 2.
Denote Trading rule 2 by q. By definition of lb, ub, ls and us, we
have lb = 6581 , ub =
76
81 , ls =
56
81 and us =
67
81 . Hence, ls ≤ ub and
lb ≤ us.
We show that Trading rule 1 is not ex post-implementable with
quitting rights. Suppose t is a transfer scheme such that (q, t) is
IC* and EPIR. We derive a contradiction. On the one hand, theconstraint U∗s (1, 1) ≥ U
∗
s (0, 1) yields
8
i=5 t(i, 0) ≤ t(8, 1) + 3.
Since (q, t) is EPIR, we know that t(8, 1) ≤ 8. Thus,
8
b=5
t(bi, 0) ≤ t(8, 1) + 3 ≤ 8 + 3 = 11.




b (6, 6) ≥
U∗b (4, 6) and U
∗
b (7, 7) ≥ U
∗
b (4, 7) yield
7
b=5
t(bi, 0) ≥ 12.
Since t(8, 0) ≥ 0 by EPIR, we derived a contradiction.
Example 3.6. This example provides a trading rule t which is ex
post-implementable, but not ex post-implementable with quitting
rights.
Let Vb = Vs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and assume that the val-
uations are uniformly distributed. Consider Trading rule 3 below.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Trading rule 3.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0
Transfer scheme t ′.
Denote Trading rule 3 by q. Define t ′ as above. Then (q, t ′) is IC
and EPIR. However, (q, t ′) is not IC*, since U∗b (7, 7) < U
∗
b (8, 7).
We show that there is no t such that (q, t) is IC* and EPIR. Let
t be such that (q, t) is IC* and EPIR. By IC* for the buyer, t(6, 0) =
t(7, 0) ≥ 5, respectively. By IC* for the seller, 7 ≤ t(8, 1) = · · · =
t(8, 7) ≤ 8. This implies that a buyer with bi = 7 reporting b′i = 8
will reject all trade with each seller sj with 1 ≤ sj ≤ 7. Hence
U∗b (7, 7) ≥ U
∗
b (8, 7) implies t(8, 0) ≥ t(7, 0). This implies that
U∗s (0, 1) =






t(8, 1) − 1
9
= U∗s (1, 1),
which contradicts with the constraints of IC*.
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Example 3.7. This example shows that the existence of a valuation
with probability zero matters for implementability.1 In the
example, the choice of considering a valuation with probability
zero or not considering that valuation, determines whether the
trading rule is implementable.





Denote Trading rule 1 by q. The proofs in Matsuo (1989) show
that if m = n = 2, interim-implementation and ex post-
implementation with quitting rights are equivalent. By definition
of lb, ub, ls and us, and fb(1) + fb(3) = 1 and f2(0) + f2(2) = 1, we
have
lb = (1 − fb(1)) · (1 − fs(0)),
ub = fs(0) + 3 · (1 − fb(1)) · (1 − fs(0)),
ls = 2 · (1 − fb(1)),
us = 3 · (1 − fb(1)) + 2 · fb(1) · fs(0).
Observe that lb ≤ us for all fb(1) and fs(0). By Theorem 3.3, q is
interim implementable and ex post-implementable with quitting
rights if and only if
1 − fb(1) − 2 · fs(0) + 3 · fb(1) · fs(0) ≥ 0.
From Fig. 1, we can see that if 0 ≤ fb(1) < 12 and fs(0) =
1, q is not ex post-implementable with quitting rights. However,
it is clear that if Vs = {0}, a posted price in between 0 and 1
guarantees IC*, EPIR and ex post efficiency. So the question which
valuations to include into the set of valuations can have important
consequences.
4. Two classes of trading rules
This section analyses two specific subclasses of trading rules:
ex post efficient trading rules and threshold trading rules. These
subclasses of trading rules only contain rules that are deterministic
and monotone. A trading rule q is monotone if q(bi, sj) ≤ q(bk, sℓ)
for all bi ≤ bk ∈ Vb and all sj ≥ sℓ ∈ Vs. A trading rule q is
deterministic if q(bi, sj) ∈ {0, 1} for all bi ∈ Vb and all sj ∈ Vs.
1 Othman and Sandholm (2009) use the same example as their motivating
example.It is known that the restriction of deterministic trading rules
in general does not hamper the analysis, since for example
second-best Pareto optimality can be established within this class
of trading rules (e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Gresik,
1991a). The advantage of this class of trading rules is that the
expected probability of trade is automatically monotone. As a
result, we do not need to add monotonicity properties for the
expected probabilities of trade as separate requirements in the
analysis. Moreover, Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) show that
for the class of deterministic and monotone trading rules, ex post-
implementability is equivalent to ex post-implementability with
quitting rights if transfers are monotone.
Our main results are as follows. In the class of ex post ef-
ficient trading rules, we prove that there always exists strictly
positive probability mass functions that guarantee interim-
implementability. In the class of threshold trading rules, a trad-
ing rule is interim-implementable as soon as it does not allow
inefficient trade,2and ex post-implementable with quitting rights
if the trading rule is posted price implementable. Thus, all reason-
able threshold trading rules are interim-implementable, whereas
ex post-implementability with quitting rights coincideswith dom-
inant strategy implementation (Hagerty and Rogerson, 1987).
4.1. Ex post efficient trading rules
From a social point of view it is optimal to have trade whenever
the buyer values the object higher than the seller, and not to have
trade whenever the seller values the object higher than the buyer.
A trading rule q is ex post efficient (EPE) if q(bi, sj) = 1 whenever
bi > sj and q(bi, sj) = 0 whenever bi ≤ sj.
The famous impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) only holds if valuations are continuously distributed with
positive density on overlapping intervals. The following theorem
shows that the impossibility result is not valid in the discrete
setting. That is, there always exist probability mass functions such
that ex post efficient and interim individually rational trade is
feasible.
Theorem 4.1. Let q be EPE. There exist strictly positive fb and fs such
that q is interim-implementable.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3, q is interim-implementable if and only if
ls ≤ ub. For all bi ∈ Vb and all sj ∈ Vs, define s(bi) = max{sℓ ∈ Vs |





sj · Fs(sj) − sj−1 · Fs(sj−1)








sℓ · (Fb(sℓ+1) − Fb(sℓ))








s(bi) · q(bi, sj) · fb(bi) · fs(sj).
An analogous analysis holds for the buyer. So,





(b(sj) − s(bi)) · q(bi, sj) · fb(bi) · fs(sj) ≥ 0.
2 A deterministic trading rule q allows inefficient trade when q(bi, sj) = 1 for
some bi ∈ Vb and sj ∈ Vs with bi < sj .
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More formally, bk = min{bi ∈ Vb | bi > sj for some sj ∈ Vs}.
If such valuation does not exist, bm < s1 and thus q(bi, sj) = 0
for all bi ∈ Vb and all sj ∈ Vs, which implies that q is interim-
implementable for every fb and fs. Otherwise, define fs(sj) = 1n for
all sj ∈ Vs. Notice that
n
j=1
(b(sj) − s(bk)) · q(bi, sj) ·
1
n




where the first inequality follows by definition of bk. This implies
that there exists a strictly positive probability density function fb





(b(sj) − s(bi)) · q(bi, sj) ·
1
n
· fb(bi) > 0.
Hence the result follows. 
4.2. Threshold trading rules
A trading rule q is a threshold trading rule if there are vb ∈ Vb
and vs ∈ Vs such that q(bi, sj) = 1 whenever bi ≥ vb and sj ≤ vs,
and q(bi, sj) = 0 otherwise.
A trading rule q is posted price implementable if there is a transfer
scheme t such that there is a price p > 0, where t(bi, sj) = p with
sj ≤ p ≤ bi whenever q(bi, sj) = 1, and t(bi, sj) = 0 otherwise.
In a posted price mechanism, a transfer is only made when trade
occurs, and the size of the transfer is exactly p.
In the class of threshold trading rules, ex post-implementation
with quitting rights is equivalent to posted price implementation.
Theorem 4.2. Let q be a threshold trading rule, characterized by vb
and vs. Then
(i) q is interim-implementable if and only if vb ≥ vs.
(ii) q is ex post-implementable with quitting rights if and only if q is
posted price implementable.
Proof. For (i). By Theorem 3.3, q is interim-implementable if and
only if ls ≤ ub. By definition of ls and ub, we have
ls ≤ ub ⇔ vs · (1 − Fb(vb−1)) · Fs(vs) ≤ vb · (1 − Fb(vb−1)) · Fs(vs).
For (ii). Suppose q is ex post-implementable with quitting
rights. Then q is interim-implementable. So by (i), vb ≥ vs. If vb =
b1, setting p = vs shows that q is posted price implementable. If
vs = sn, setting p = vb shows that q is posted price implementable.
If vb > b1 and vs < sn, then by Theorem 3.4, lb ≤ us. By definition
of lb and us, we have
lb ≤ us ⇔ vb−1 · (1 − Fb(vb−1)) · Fs(vs)
≤ vs+1 · (1 − Fb(vb−1)) · Fs(vs).
Since vb ≥ vs and vb−1 ≤ vs+1, there exists a p such that vb−1 ≤
p ≤ vb and vs ≤ p ≤ vs+1, which shows that q is posted price
implementable.
The converse implication follows by definition of posted price
implementation. 
Remark. The result of Theorem 4.2(ii) also applies if q ex post-
implementable.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides a study of the bilateral trade model with
discrete valuations. We focus on ex post individual rationalityas the majority of research on this topic does not incorporate
this stronger notion of individual rationality. Although potential
players could be hesitant to participate in a mechanism that can
leave them worse of compared to what they begin with. In order
to illustrate the strength of our necessary condition, we investigate
the class of threshold trading rules and find a close connection to
posted price mechanisms.
Two interesting open questions are the following. How can ex
post-implementationwith quitting rights be characterized? Are ex
post efficient trading rules also ex post-implementable for some
strictly positive densities fb and fs?
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Appendix
Definition A.1. A direct mechanism (q, t) is weakly incentive
compatible (WIC) if
Ub (bi, bi) ≥ Ub (bi+1, bi) for all i = 1, . . . ,m − 1,


















for all j = 2, . . . ,m.
A mechanism is weakly incentive compatible if no player has
an incentive to misreport to those valuations adjacent to his own
valuation. Clearly, any direct mechanism satisfying IC will also
satisfy WIC. The following lemma shows that the converse is also
true.
Lemma A.2. A direct mechanism (q, t) is IC if and only if (q, t) is
WIC.
Proof of Lemma A.2. The ‘‘only if’’ part follows by definition of IC.
For the ‘‘if’’ part, we that no buyerwants tomisreport to a higher
valuation. A similar argument hold for misreporting to a lower
valuation. Analogous for the seller.
Assume (q, t) is WIC. For all i = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
Ub (bi, bi) ≥ Ub (bi+1, bi)
= Ub (bi+1, bi+1) + (bi − bi+1) · q̄b (bi+1)
≥ Ub (bi, bi+1) + (bi − bi+1) · q̄b (bi+1)
= Ub (bi, bi) + (bi+1 − bi) · q̄b (bi)
+ (bi − bi+1) · q̄b (bi+1) ,
and thus
q̄b (bi) ≤ q̄b (bi+1) . (2)
Let bi ∈ Vb. We prove by induction that
Ub (bi, bi) ≥ Ub (bk, bi)
for all bk ∈ Vb with bk > bi.
For the base case bk = bi+1, WIC directly implies that Ub (bi) ≥
Ub (bi+1, bi).
Assume that the induction step holds for bk < bm, then
Ub (bi, bi) ≥ Ub (bk, bi)
= Ub (bk, bk) + (bi − bk) · q̄b (bk)
≥ Ub (bk+1, bk) + (bi − bk) · q̄b (bk)
≥ Ub (bk+1, bk) + (bi − bk) · q̄b (bk+1)
= Ub (bk+1, bi)
where the third inequality follows from bk > bi and inequality
(2). 
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Lemma A.3. Let (q, t) be IC. Then for all bi ∈ Vb and all sj ∈ Vs
Ub (b1, b1) +
i−1
k=1
(bk+1 − bk) · q̄b (bk) ≤ Ub (bi, bi)
≤ Ub (b1, b1) +
i−1
k=1
(bk+1 − bk) · q̄b (bk+1) , (3)
Us (sn, sn) +
n
ℓ=j+1




≤ Us (sn, sn) +
n
ℓ=j+1
(sℓ − sℓ−1) · q̄s (sℓ−1) . (4)
Proof of Lemma A.3. Let us prove the left inequality of (3). The
proofs of the other inequalities are analogous.
For all i = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
Ub (bi+1, bi+1) − Ub (bi, bi) ≥ Ub (bi, bi+1) − Ub (bi, bi)
= (bi+1 − bi) · q̄b (bi) .
For each bi ∈ Vb, adding all inequalities for k = 1, . . . , i − 1 yields
the desired result. 
Lemma A.4. If a direct mechanism (q, t) is IC, then
Ub (b1, b1) + Us (sn, sn) ≤ ub − ls.






























Ub (b1, b1) +
i−1
k=1







Us (sn, sn) +
n
ℓ=j+1






= Ub (b1, b1) + Us (sn, sn) +
m−1
i=1
(bi+1 − bi) · (1 − Fb (bi))
· q̄b (bi) +
n
j=2









where the inequality follows from Lemma A.3. Rearranging
the first and last term of these expressions yields the desired
inequality. 
Lemma A.5. Let (q, t) be IC. Then
(a) the functions q̄b (bi), Ub (bi, bi) and t̄b (bi) are all non-decreasing
in bi.














Proof. IC implies WIC and thus by inequality (2), q̄b (bi) is non-
decreasing in bi. The proof of LemmaA.3 and q̄b (bi) ≥ 0 shows that
Ub (bi, bi) is non-decreasing in bi. It remains to show that t̄b (bi) isnon-decreasing in bi. For all i = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
Ub (bi, bi) − Ub (bi+1, bi) = bi · (q̄b (bi) − q̄b (bi+1))
+ t̄b (bi+1) − t̄b (bi) ≥ 0.
Since q̄b (bi) ≤ q̄b (bi+1) is non-decreasing in bi, the above
inequality implies that t̄b (bi+1) − t̄b (bi) ≥ 0 and thus that t̄b (bi)
is non-decreasing in bi. The proofs for the seller are analogous. 
The following lemma is the discrete analogue of a result in
Gresik and Satterthwaite (1983).





















For each buyer with a valuation of bi for i = 2, . . . ,m, IC implies
t̄b (bi) − t̄b (bi−1) ≤ bi · (q̄b (bi) − q̄b (bi−1)) .
By adding all these inequalities for k = 2, . . . , b, we get
t̄b (bi) − t̄b (b1) ≤
i
k=2
bk · (q̄b (bk) − q̄b (bk−1)) .
By IIR, we have t̄b(b1) ≤ b1 · q̄b(b1) and thus
t̄b (bi) ≤ b1 · q̄b(b1) +
i
k=2
bk · (q̄b (bk) − q̄b (bk−1)) . (5)
























(bi · (1 − Fb(bi−1)) − bi+1 · (1 − Fb(bi))) · q̄b(bi)
= ub.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. For the ‘‘only if’’ part, assume that q is
interim-implementable. By Lemma A.5, q̄b(bi) is non-decreasing in
bi and q̄s(sj) is non-increasing in sj. By Lemma A.6, ls ≤ ub.
For the ‘‘if’’ part, assume that q̄b(bi) is non-decreasing in bi, q̄s(sj)
is non-increasing in sj and ls ≤ ub.Wewill define a transfer scheme
t such that (q, t) is IC and IIR. Define
t(bi, sj) = b1 · q̄b (b1) +
i
k=2








sℓ · (1 − Fs (sℓ)) · (q̄s (sℓ) − q̄s (sℓ+1)) .
J. Flesch et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 84 (2016) 68–75 75We show that (q, t) is IC and IIR. Notice that all the three sums
on the right-hand side are non-negative, due to our assumptions
on q̄b(·) and q̄s(·). The first term is chosen so that (q, t) satisfies
incentive compatibility for the buyer, the second term so that (q, t)
satisfies incentive compatibility for the buyer and the third term so
that (q, t) satisfies Ub(b1, b1) = 0 and Us(sn, sn) ≥ 0.
To check IC for the buyer, for bi, bi′ ∈ Vb with bi > bi′ , we have


















bk · (q̄b (bk) − q̄b (bk−1))
≥ 0.
Similar if bi < bi′ .


































sj · (q̄s (sℓ) − q̄s (sℓ+1))
≥ 0
Similar if sj′ < sj.
To check IIR, we have
















b1 · q̄b (b1) +
i
k=2









sℓ · (1 − Fs (sℓ)) · (q̄s (sℓ) − q̄s (sℓ+1))









sj · Fs(sj) − sj−1 · Fs(sj−1)

· q̄s(sj)
= ub − ls
≥ 0. 
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